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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD R. HOYT AND 
MAUDE S. HOYT, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
WASATCH HOMES, INC., a 
Utah Corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant 
Case No. 7919 
PETITION FOR REHEARING AND 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
Come now Richard R. Hoyt and Maude S. Hoyt the 
respondents above named, and respectfully petition this 
honorable Court for a rehearing in the said cause as to the 
items hereinafter mentioned, and as a basis for such re-
hearing allege as follows: 
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1. The Court erred in concluding that ((the parties 
did come to agreement as to the terms and time of pay-
ment of the $19,000 balance and the security to be furn-
ished by the purchasers (Johnsons) ". 
2. The Court erred in concluding that ((The plain-
tiff Richard R. Hoyt himself admitted that the terms 
contained in the Eggertson memorandum were acceptable 
to him." 
3. The Court erred in concluding that ((there existed 
no point of difficulty of any importance between Hoyt 
and the purchasers ( J ohnsons) . " 
4. The Court erred in concluding ((There is no indi-
cation in the record that Hoyt ever voiced any dissatis-
faction with the security arrangements except his own 
failure to inspect the Montana property. Plainly this dere-
liction on his own part is of no avail to him in refusing 
to go forward with the contract." 
5. The Court erred in concluding that the Johnsons 
had made arrangements for another improvement bond. 
6. The Court erred in concluding that ((if it had been 
Johnsons who had failed and refused to complete the trans-
action, Hoyt was authorized by the Agreement to retain 
and forfeit the $1,000 as (liquidated and agreed damages.'" 
7. The Court erred in concluding as follows: ((That 
he (Hoyt) was aware that Johnsons had preserved their 
rights under the contract, were willing and able to com-
plete the transaction, and that he was therefore not in a 
position to forfeit them out, is clearly manifest by the fact 
that he paid them $1,000 for the contract of rescission." 
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8. The Court erred in concluding that the Johnsons 
had not failed in their obligations, and that they were 
ready, willing and able buyers. . 
9. The Court erred in failing to do as it stated in its 
opinion that it was obliged to do, namely: ((To take the 
evidence and all fair inferences therefrom in the light most 
favorable to plaintiffs because they prevailed in the lower 
courts." 
10. The Court erred in reversing and remanding the 
judgment of the trial court with directions to vacate judg-
ment in favor of plaintiffs and enter judgment in favor of 
defendant on its counter claim. 
ROMNEY & NELSON 
Attorneys for Respondents 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
We respectfully submit that this petition for rehear-
ing was presented only after a careful examination of the 
opinion of this honorable Court, which led to the sincere 
conviction that the said opinion is based largely upon 
erroneous conclusions drawn from the evidence in the 
record. We shall attempt in this brief argument to show 
the Court where the overwhelming weight of the evidence 
does not sustain the conclusions arrived at by this honor-
able Court in its majority opinion. This brief necessarily 
deals primarily with the facts rather than the law, for the 
reason that the alleged errors, whch we shall attempt to 
point out, are primarily errors of fact rather than law. 
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We shall take up the points raised in our petition for 
rehearing in the same order as they are set out hereinabove: 
1. In the opinion of this Court the following state-
ment appears: ((After further negotiations, the parties did 
come to agreement as to the terms and time of payment of 
the $19,000 balance and the security to be furnished by 
the purchasers ( J ohnsons) . " 
The only testimony on this point is that of Richard 
R. Hoyt, Mark B. Eggertsen, Beatta Johnson and Elmer J. 
Johnson. 
Hoyt's testimony is that the -discussion in Eggertsen's 
office ((was just a discussion and that after we had ironed 
out some of our other problems and they were satisfactory 
to both of us, then we would come back." (R. 19); also, 
concerning the terms of the memorandum (Exhibit 1), 
that neither of the parties agreed to the same (R. 22); 
also, that when they left Eggertsen's office uwe told him 
we had other matters to discuss before we could agree on 
a contract." (R. 23). 
Eggertsen testified, concerning Exhibit 1 : HI made a 
memorandum of the items that it seemed they were try-
ing to cover so that when all of the details were worked 
out that we could prepare the Uniform Real Estate Con-
tract covering the purchase and sale."; and, further: 
((There is nothing definite about it. It was merely just pre-
liminary to a final draft and so on, if all of the things they 
were discussing were worked out, as I recall it." (R. 35) · 
He also testified as follows: nWell, the conversation was 
terminated when they both-both parties seemed to agree 
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that it was-there were too many indefinite points, that 
we couldn't reduce it to contract at that time." (R. 36). 
Eggertsen further confirmed the fact that Hoyt and John-
son, before they left his office, informed him in substance 
that they wanted to discuss the matter further between 
themselves and would agree not to proceed with the prep-
aration of the uniform real estate contract until some more 
definite terms were arrived at; and that he understood the 
memorandum (Exhibit I) to be only a memorandum of 
negotiations that were being conducted between them 
looking to a possible final contract. (R. 3 8) 
The testimony of Beatta Johnson is that the parties 
were in entire agreement when Exhibit I was drawn 
(R. 46). However, her testimony tails to disclose that the 
parties ever agreed upon any of the terms of payment of 
the $19,000. Her testimony further is that they were un-
able to get a bond, that the General Company turned 
them down and that she does not know whether U. S. F. 
& G. turned them down or not. (R. 53). She also testi-
fied that they were intending to put up a cash bond for 
improvements but that they never advised Mr. Hoyt 
thereof. (R. 57 & 58). Mrs. Johnson further testified that 
she was employed as a real estate salesman by the appellant 
Wasatch Homes, Inc. during all the time when these trans-
actions were had. (R. 51) 
Elmer J. Johnson merely ratified in substance the tes-
timony of his wife. (R. 61) 
We further point out that the agreement (Exhibit 
C) between the Johnsons and the Hoyts recites in part as 
follows: ccWhereas .... the said parties have been negoti-
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ating since the said time for the consummation of the 
sale and purchase of the property, but have been unable 
to agree upon the terms and conditions of the said pro-
posed purchase and sale;" 
The evidence hereinabove recited overwhelmingly 
establishes that there was no meeting of minds or agree-
ment whatever concerning the method or terms or time 
of payment of the $19,000.00. It is undisputed that Hoyt 
had never inspected or passed upon the security which the 
Johnsons had in mind offering him. Surely it would be 
most unjust to force the respondents to accept security, 
whatever it may be, which they never agreed to accept 
and which they never had an opportunity to inspect or 
appraise. 
2. This Court further stated: t(The plaintiff Richard 
R. Hoyt himself admitted that the terms contained in the 
Eggertson memorandum were acceptable to him." 
It is true that counsel for the appellant attempted 
strenuously in his cross examination of Hoyt to get him 
to admit that the terms of Exhibit 1 were acceptable to 
him. The following is taken from the said cross examina-
tion (R. 22 & 23): 
HQ Was Mr. Johnson agreeable to the terms as set 
down in the memorandum by Mr. Eggertson? 
A Well, of course, neither one of us agreed to them 
at that time. 
I 
Q I know, but were these terms acceptable to him? J 
A As far as I know, they were. 
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Q And were they acceptable to you? 
A Not until after we had solved our other problems 
that confronted us. 
Q Now, let we ask you, the terms that are set down 
liere were acceptable to you as far as you were concerned 
except you wanted to inspect the prope:I"ty in Bozeman? 
A And I wanted him to obtain a bond for those im-
provements. 
Q Well, now, let's take it a step at a time. First you 
wanted to inspect this property in Bozeman which you 
were to have-
A As security. 
Q-a deed for security on, and you wanted the bond 
posted. Is that right? 
A That's right. 
Q Now, let me ask you, Mr. Hoyt, if it isn't a fact 
that when you left Mr. Eggertsen's office you had instruc-
ed him to prepare a uniform real estate contract embody-
ing the terms shown in exhibit 1. 
A That's incorrect. 
Q What had you· instructed him to do? 
A To just wait until we had solved our other diffi-
culties, and when we did that, we told him we would come 
back. When we left his office, we told him we had other 
matters to discuss before we could agree on a contract. 
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We respectfully submit that this testimony does not 
establish that the terms of the said Exhibit 1 were wholly 
acceptable to Hoyt. This is particularly true in view of 
the light of Hoyt's other testimony that there were other 
things undetermined, such as the appraisement of the 
Montana property (R. 18), the necessity of Johnson's 
paying for the improvements on the 20 lots (R. 18), the 
Johnsons' inability to furnish the bond (R. 19), and that 
the said memorandum was merely an indication of a pre-
liminary discussion. ( R. 19) 
3. This Court further stated that ccthere existed no 
point of difficulty of any importance between Hoyt and 
the purchasers ( J ohnsons) . " 
It is apparent from the overwhelming weight of the 
evidence that there were at least 2 primary points which 
remained undetermined, namely: First, the method and 
terms of payment of the $19,000 and, second, the pay-
ment for the improvements on the lots, or the furnishing 
of a bond for the same. It cannot be disputed that these 
two points of difficulty between the parties did exist, and 
that according to the evidence of the respondents and 
their independent witness, Eggertsen, the said matters had 
not been determined. The only remaining question, there-
fore, would be whether the said points are ccof any import-
ance." It would seem to be apparent that the time and 
method and terms of payment of the sum of $19,000 is 
of exceeding importance to the respondents. It is a con-
siderable sum, and represents by far the major portion of 
the entire purchase price. By the same token the security~ 
which the appellant had in mind conveying to the re-
spondents for the said payment was of equal importance. 
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It goes without saying that in the' promotion of a 
subdivision the payment for the improvements thereon are 
rp.ost vital to the progress of the subdivision. This fact is 
borne out by the testimony of Mark Eggertsen as follows: 
((As I recall particularly there was the determination of 
the two properties that were to be security and Mr. John-
son's procuring an improvement bond, and then I made 
the comment to them that the plat should be completed 
and :filed before any instrument was executed involving 
the sale of lots. Our statute is quite clear, I pointed out, 
that it is unlawful to sell a property before it is a legal 
parcel of land." 
4. In referring to the ((failure" of Hoyt to inspect 
the Montana property, this Court stated: ccPlainly this 
dereliction on his own part is of no avail to him in refusing 
to go forward with the contract." 
We are unable to :find in the record any testimony 
to the effect that it was Hoyt's obligation to go to Mon-
tana and inspect the Montana property, or that he was 
derelict in any sense in not inspecting the same. The un-
disputed testimony of Mr. Hoyt is that Johnson told him 
he would take him up to Montana for the purpose of ap-
praising the property. (R. 18) We fail to find any basis 
in the record upon which Hoyt could be charged with 
any dereliction in this matter. 
S. The Court further stated that ccThe Johnsons both 
testified that they had made arrangements for another 
bond; this was not disputed;" 
Beatta Johnson testified on cross examination that 
they tried to get a bond and were turned down by the 
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((General Company" but that she did not know whether 
the U.S.F. & G. Company turned them down or not. (R. 
53) She further testified on redirect examination that in 
the forepart of January, 1952, they were going to put up 
a cash bond for the improvements; that they had a man 
that was going in with them and put up the cash but that 
they never advised Mr. Hoyt of that. (R. 57 & 58) We 
respectfully remind the Court that even if they did have 
some intention of putting up a cash bond their failure to 
advise the respondents of their arrangements constituted 
a failure on their part to make complete arrangements for 
the bond. Furthermore, the testimony of Beatta Johnson, 
we submit, does not establish even that final arrangements 
for such a cash bond had been made. 
6. This Court in its opinion states: Hi£ it had been 
Johnsons who had failed and refused to complete the trans-
action, Hoyt was authorized by the Agreement to retain 
and forfeit the $1,000 as (liquidated and agreed damages.'" 
This legal conclusion does not comport with the de-
cision of this honorable Court in the case of Perkins vs. 
Spencer, 243 Pac. 2d, 446. In that case the purchaser had 
occupied the premises for a considerable time and the facts 
generally seemed to be more favorable to a proper case of 
liquidated damages than the instant case. In the case at 
bar, according to the reasoning of this Court, Hoyt was 
anxious to get the Johnsons out of the transaction and 
presumably, therefore, would find it difficult to establish 
any damages at all. In the Perkins v. Spencer case the ma-l 
jority opinion, delivered by Mr. Justice Crockett, recites 
in part as follows: 
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uw e hold that under the facts of this case, 
the forfeiture provision amounted to a penalty 
which is unenforceable. Defendants contend that 
to so rule nullifies their contract and leaves them 
with no other recourse than they would have had 
if no such provision had been included. It is true 
that this should be done only with great reluc-
tance and when the facts clearly demonstrate 
that it would be unconscionable to decree en-
forcement of the terms of the contract. This is 
such a case. 
u (8) When the contract prov1s1on is un-
enforceable, the only way rights of the parties 
can be adjusted is on the basis of damages ordi-
narily recoverable for such breach of contract. 
See Malmberg v. Baugh, supra. 
cc {9) The vendors are entitled to any loss 
occasioned them by any of these factors: 
( 1) Loss of an advantageous bargain. 
( 2) Any damage to or depreciation of the 
property; 
( 3 ) Any decline in value due to change in 
market value of the property not al-
lowed for in items nos. 1 and 2; and 
( 4) For the fair rental value of the prop-
erty during the period of occupancy. 
uThe total of such sums should be deducted 
from the total amount paid in, plus any im-
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provements for which it would be fair to allow 
recovery, and any remaining difference awarded 
to the plaintiffs." 
If this court could conclude in the Perkins v. Spen-
cer case that the forfeiture provision amounted to a pen-
alty it is difficult to see how, in the instant case, the ap-
pellant could retain and forfeit the $1,000 as ((liquidated 
and agreed adamages." 
7. We refer to this Court's statement as follows: 
((That he (Hoyt) was aware that Johnsons had preserved 
their rights under the contract, were willing and able to 
complete the transaction, and that he was, therefore, not 
in a position to forfeit them out, is clearly manifest by the 
fact that he paid them $1,000 for the contract of rescis-
sion." 
We respectfully refer to the agreement (Exhibit C) 
which was made between the parties at the time the $1,000 
was paid by Hoyt to Johnson. That agreement recites in 
part: ccThe said parties have been negotiating since the 
said time for the consummation of sale and purchase of 
the property, but have been unable to agree upon the 
terms and conditions of the said proposed purchase and 
sale." It should be borne in mind that Hoyt was under 
the necessity of proceeding with the promotion of his 
subdivision; that Johnsons' failure to procure an improve-
ment bond and to complete the purchase upon terms 
agreeable to Hoyt was delaying the entire project; that 
although Hoyt may have been able to terminate Johnsons' 
rights without paying any consideration, by means of a 
court action, such a proceeding would necessarily entall 
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some delay and expense; that a reasonable solution to the 
problem was to return to Johnsons the $1,000 which they 
had paid and to restore the parties to their former status. 
The fact that Hoyt did this should not in any sense be 
taken as evidence that Johnsons had fulfilled their part 
of the agreement. If it should be considered evidence that 
Hoyt thought that Johnsons had fulfilled their agree-
ment, such fact would be immaterial. It is most likely 
that Hoyt was willing to return the $1,000 to Johnsons 
because he had confidence in his right to recover the said 
sum from the appellant herein. At any rate, Hoyt's will-
ingness to restore the $1,000 to Johnsons should not be 
considered evidence of anything other than his desire to 
be fair with Johnsons. Certainly such attitude should not 
be the basis of penalizing Mr. Hoyt. 
8. We contend that the Court's conclusion that the 
Johnsons had not failed in their obligations, and that they 
were ready, willing and able buyers, is erroneous for the 
reasons set forth hereinabove. We deem it unnecessary to 
repeat the various arguments hereinabove stated. 
9. We concur in the Court's statement that it is 
obliged to take the evidence and all fair inferences there-
from in the light most favorable to plaintiffs because they 
prevailed in the lower court. However, we respectfully 
point out that after stating the said rule this Court has 
utterly failed to follow it. 
We have reviewed hereinabove the salient points of 
the evidence in the record which sustain the findings of 
1 the trial court that there was no meeting of the minds of 
the parties with respect to the sale of the property. We 
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submit that it cannot be denied that there was competent 
evidence to sustain such a finding. Even if the evidence 
is viewed in the light most favorable to the appellants it 
cannot be said that there is any competent evidence to 
sustain a conclusion that the respondent ever agreed to 
accept property which he had never seen nor appraised 
as security for the payment of $19,000. The most that 
could possibly be said of the conversation in Eggertsen's 
office and the memorandum (Exhibit 1) is that it was a 
discussion of some of the terms of the payment of the 
$19,000, which was not signed by the parties and which 
could not possibly be considered as a binding agreement. 
The Earnest Money Receipt and Agreement (Exhibit A), 
at best is nothing more than an agreement to attempt to 
agree in the future in respect to some of the most vital 
parts of the proposed sale. We submit that if either party 
attempted to enforce the terms of the agreement as set 
forth in Exhibit A it would be impossible for any court to 
determine the rights of the respective parties. 
10. In citing the error of this Court in reversing and 
remanding the judgment, we refer to the argument set 
forth in each of the 9 points hereinabove, and, without 
repeating them, make them a part of our argument in 
support of this citation of error. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROMNEY & NELSON 
Attorneys for Respondents 
212 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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